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The extent to which efficient financial markets are a necessary pre-condition for 
development or merely a consequence of development has been long debated by 
economists.
1 In the case of the GCC the latter arguably applies as financial 
markets have developed in response to the needs of largely oil-based economies, 
but have played little part in shaping or facilitating economic development. 
Governments, with the possible exception of Bahrain, have done more to hinder 
than to encourage the growth of financial markets, and the GCC itself has not 
formulated any explicit policy. 
 
The GCC markets are essentially national, although Bahrain has emerged 
as a significant regional financial centre, largely through unilateral opportunism 
rather than as a result of any planned regional co-ordination. Nevertheless 
though developments have been haphazard, the GCC has the most developed 
financial markets in the Arab World. This is largely a consequence of the oil 
wealth in the region, the free convertibility and stability of the currencies and the 
relative openness of the economies to international trade that requires financing.
2 
 
In this paper the GCC markets for banking services and company stock 
are examined. The role of Bahrain as a regional financial centre is assessed. The 
market for Islamic financing is discussed, as this is one area where the region 
makes a distinctive contribution to international finance. Links with Europe are 
reviewed, notably the involvement of European banks in the region. The scope 
for greater financial co-operation with Europe is considered, areas of potential 
interest including the use of the Euro, the cross listing of company stock and 
harmonisation of disclosure requirements and accounting practices by quoted 
companies. 
 
The future role of GCC markets in global finance is far from clear, and 
the competitive strengths and weaknesses of the region in relation to major 
European centres must be acknowledged. Location, cultural and linguistic 
                                            
1 Maxwell Fry, “Money and capital: financial deepening in economic development”, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 10, Number 1, 1979, pp. 464-475. 
2 John Presley and Rodney Wilson, Banking in the Arab Gulf, Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 
1-8.  
factors could give the GCC markets some potential competitive edge over other 
regions as far as the Mediterranean Arab states are concerned, which might be of 
interest to the European Union in the context of the Barcelona process. 
Nevertheless the trilateral co-operation involving Gulf capital, European 
expertise and Mediterranean Arab labour that was envisaged in the 1970s during 
the oil price boom never materialised, and scepticism must remain about this 
ever becoming a reality. 
 
GCC financial institutions also enjoy some competitive advantage in 
niche areas such as Islamic financing as just mentioned. Here there is increasing 
co-operation between GCC based institutions and banks and markets in south 
and south east Asia, notably those of Pakistan, Malaysia and Brunei, and to a 
lesser extent Bangladesh and Indonesia. Some leading European bank offer a 
limited range of Islamic financial products, but little is available at the retail 
level for the vast majority of European Muslims in Britain, France and 
Germany, or indeed in the Balkans. There is potential for cooperation with GCC 
institutions in such financing, which the Jeddah based Islamic Development 
Bank and some of the Bahrain based Islamic commercial banks are interested in 
promoting. 
 
Nature of banking services 
 
Commercial banking services were the first to be provided in the Gulf countries, 
with much of the business being focused on trade finance with the provision of 
letters of credit, drafts and other trading facilities on a fee basis. As governments 
provided longer term development funding and project finance, the commercial 
banks tended to concentrate on short-term credits, and investment banking failed 
to develop. Family run business generated most of their financing from 
ploughed back profit or informal borrowings from family members, which 
limited the need for formal financial intermediation. Foreign exchange was often 
supplied by money-changers rather than banks, further limiting the scope for 
formal services. In these circumstances it was not surprising that the spread of 
banking was rather slow in relation to the expansion of economic activity in the 
Gulf with the advent of oil. 
 
The banking products provided by GCC based banks are traditional: they 
accept deposits, grant loans, and provide account / payment services. As the 
region imports most consumer and capital goods, and the expatriate population 
(almost 30 percent of the region's total of 30 million inhabitants) transfer their 
wealth to their home countries, trade finance and international payments are also 
important products. The single most important product is extending loan 
facilities; it represents 45 percent of commercial banks' total assets. 
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Although trade financing still accounts for much of the banking business 
in the Gulf, there has been a growth in personal and consumer financing in 
recent years as the retail markets in financial services have expanded. 
Government employees, the majority of whom are now Gulf citizens, have their 
salaries paid into bank accounts rather than been paid in cash. Personal 
customers wish to maintain savings and investment accounts as well as current 
accounts, so that they can earn some return on their money even if it is relatively 
modest. In Saudi Arabia however, partly due to customer concerns about the 
Islamic prohibition of riba or interest, and partly due to account inertia, over 
sixty percent of deposits remain in current accounts rather than being in higher 
yielding savings accounts, which reduces the costs of money to the banks.
3 
 
Around one third of bank lending is now for house purchase, vehicle 
acquisition or the finance of “big ticket” consumer durable items. Housing loans 
are a relatively recent development in the Gulf, as in the past state owned real 
estate development institutions provided much of this financing on a subsidised 
interest free basis, but as there is now an eight year waiting list for such finance 
in Saudi Arabia, borrowers have turned to the commercial banks. As in the West 
vehicle distributors often encourage clients to purchase on credit or lease, which 
provides additional lending possibilities for the banks. 
 
The client segments available to the GCC banks in their local markets 
offer little diversification. The region's economies tend to be dominated by 
Government spending; with the exception of Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent 
the UAE, there is no manufacturing industry on the Peninsula. The corporate 
sector is heavily concentrated, with just a few ten families controlling the bulk 
of the GDP not produced through public services. The Government is a 
dominant client of the GCC banking system, both directly through borrowing 
funds from or placing money with the banks, and indirectly through government 
business with local companies, e.g. the construction industry. Otherwise, 
corporate banking opportunities are limited. Retail business tends to focus on 
loans, e.g. for housing mortgages or car purchases. Private banking clients, often 
described as high net worth individuals, tend to take their money abroad, but 
increasingly, GCC banks are developing products and services for this lucrative 
client segment. 
 
Characterizing the typical GCC based bank, it provides in its immediate 
location a limited range of deposit, credit and payment (including trade finance) 
products to traditional clients segments (retail, corporate and their local public 
sector). It shows strength in vital aspects: the bank is focused, has a solid home 
base, and enjoys a good reputation in its local market. On the other hand, it faces 
                                            
3 Riyadh Bank, Saudi Economic Review, Third Quarter 2000, pp. 9-10. 
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various challenges: the bank's products are unsophisticated, it relies for its 
income on interest-based products (loans and deposits, versus fee based income, 
e.g. from wealth management), it is constrained by lack of size, and it has no 
international expertise. 
 
GCC banking assets are equivalent to approx. 85 percent of the region's 
GNP (adjusted according to purchasing power parity). The comparative figure 
for Germany is 260 percent. For the USA, the figure stands at 65 percent, but 
can be explained with the existence of efficient equity and debt capital markets. 
The GCC's debt or equity capital markets are insignificant, and investments in 
real estate offer only limited opportunities. Hence, the GCC's figure of 85 
percent supports the view that very substantial financial assets of the GCC are 
held outside the region. 
 
Structure of the banking system 
 
Although Gulf currencies are freely convertible and there are no controls on 
capital movements, the markets for banking services, with the exception of the 
Bahrain offshore market, are national rather than regional in nature. There is 
only limited competition in these markets, as the GCC states, with the 
exceptions of Bahrain and Oman, have restrictive banking licensing policies that 
only permit institutions with majority local ownership to operate. The 
governments discriminate in favour of locally owned banks in their own 
financial business, often using state owned or partially state owned banks. 
Government agencies are encouraged to adopt similar practices. 
 
The structure of the banking system created in the second half of the 
1980s has, in essence, remained unchanged for the last decade. Nowadays, the 
GCC banking system comprises of some 80 banks with total assets (based on the 
annual reports available for banks, showing year end 1999 figures) of less than $ 
300 billion. 
 
The majority of the banks - 55 of the total of 80 - are commercial banks, 
i.e. they offer deposit, credit and payment products to retail and corporate 
clients. These banks account for 80 percent of the region's banking assets. Ten 
Islamic domestic banks are licensed in five of the six GCC countries (Oman 
does not grant Islamic banking licenses); they hold 8 percent of the region's 
banking assets. The total assets of Islamic financial institutions do not represent 
the entire Islamic banking market: in Saudi Arabia alone, some $4 billion are 
invested in Islamically compatible funds, managed by the Saudi banks. The 
market for Islamic financial products has expanded for many years, and their 
market share may have reached some 10 percent. 
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Six banks undertake the investment in international capital markets of 
regional personal wealth. Their share of the assets managed is about 2 percent 
(outside the banking system, there are numerous investment companies offering 
similar services). Specialized banks, e.g. for financing small scale industrial 
start-ups, or providing housing loans only, account for 8 institutions and 1.5 
percent of assets. Finally, both Arab Banking Corporation and Gulf International 
Bank are active in the international markets; whilst based in Bahrain, their 
business is conducted with clients "offshore"; these two offshore banks represent 
almost 10 percent of total GCC banking assets. 
 
The total capital base of the GCC banking system amounts to $35 billion. 
About half of the institutions are capitalized between $100 million and $500 
million. Twenty institutions have a capital base of less than $100 million each. 
Together, these 60 institutions with a capital base of up to $500 million each 
account for approximately $10 billion of the capital employed in the GCC based 
banks. Of the remaining twenty institutions with an aggregate capital base of 
almost $25 billion, half show a capital base of more than $1 billion each, 
including the two Bahrain based offshore banks and the four largest banks in 
Saudi Arabia; the other half is capitalized at between $500 million and $1 
billion. 
 
The total asset base of GCC banks amounts to less than $300 billion. 
Almost half of the banks show total assets of less than $1 billion. About 20 
institutions show assets between $1 billion and $5 billion. Some ten institutions 
have assets between $5 billion and $10 billion. Eight institutions with assets in 
excess of $10 billion each represent total assets of $125 billion, equal to almost 
40 percent of the total market.  
 
The opening up of the markets for banking services is unlikely, as there 
are many vested interests favouring the status quo, not least the influential 
shareholders of the existing banks and the Gulf governments. The new 
investment laws in Saudi Arabia exclude the banking sector except for GCC 
based institutions,
4 even though there have been some pressures from the WTO 
and major trading partners to open up the market for financial services.
5 Take-
overs of Saudi Arabian or any other Gulf banks by European or American 
multinational banks would be unwelcome.
6 Some of the major multinationals 
                                            
4 Said Al-Shaikh, “Structure of Gulf banking and the effects of globalisation and financial 
liberalisation”, NCB Economist, Volume 9, Number 2, March/April 1999, pp. 1-2. 
5 Angus McDowall, “Two cheers for Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Economic Digest, Volume 
45, Number 8, 23
rd February 2001, pp. 4-5. 
6 Prince Abdullah bin Faisal bin Turki Alsaud, Governor of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority, makes this clear by implication, but uses measured language. See 
interview with the Arab Banker, Volume 14, Number 2, 2000, p. 17. 
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could also lose as a result of competition. Citicorp, which owns a forty percent 
stake in Saudi American Bank, or HSBC, which owns a similar stake in the 
Saudi British Bank, would not like to see the entry of American or European 
rivals into their lucrative market. 
 
There has been a long history of bad debt problems of Gulf banks, either 
as a result of fraud, or because some borrowers, including members of the ruling 
families, would not honour their debt obligations. This also makes opening up 
the banking systems a sensitive issue, as greater transparency over debt could 
cause embarrassment. In the past Gulf governments have bailed out banks that 
had bad debt by influential people, but if banks were foreign owned it would be 
more difficult to disguise, let alone justify, such interventions. Apart from moral 
hazard problems, there is the issue of who is subsidising whom. In the United 
Arab Emirates the system is even more parochial, as there are no truly national 
banks, each Emirate having its own “national” banks, owned by the local 
administration, that often has a cosy relationship with its leading clients, who are 
usually also the ruling families. It is difficult, if not impossible, to manage crises 
across borders, as was seen when a Qatari-backed bank collapsed in the 
Palestinian Autonomous Area. 
 
The fragmentation of the banking system in the Gulf into national or sub 
national units means that even the largest institutions are small players by 
international standards, with none in the global hundred top banks by asset size. 
The largest bank in the Middle East and Arab world, the National Commercial 
Bank of Saudi Arabia, is only ranked 140
th in the Banker’s Magazine ratings of 
assets. It only became a joint stock company in 1997, being hitherto owned 
largely by the Bin Mafouz family. In 1999 because of the need to ensure its 
financial stability, the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund acquired a 50 
percent shareholding, and the Government Pensions Organisation acquired 10 
percent, resulting in the bank being effectively a largely state owned institution.
7 
As the Riyad Bank, the second largest institution in the kingdom in terms of 
assets, has been half state owned since the 1950s, this means that the role of 
private capital in the Saudi Arabian banking system is very limited. Indeed the 
current trend seems to be towards nationalisation rather than privatisation, 
although this simply reflects pragmatism rather than ideology. 
 
Regulatory issues and bank risks 
 
Given the limited opportunities available to financial institutions in the GCC 
region, an expansion of their activities beyond the borders of their home country 
should seem a natural choice for at least the larger GCC banks. However, even 
                                            
7 www.alahli.com 
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in a much further developed and already converging market like the European 
Union, banking services are not easily taken across borders, as clients' 
expectations vary. Also, a bank's risk profile invariably changes when extending 
credit to clients outside the bank's domestic market, because of e.g. legislation, 
currency, accounting or enforceability risks. 
 
Banks’ capital determines their capacity to lend in a variety of ways, 
imposed on them through banking laws / regulations, usually by the local 
regulator (in the GCC, this role is always taken by the Central bank). Most 
important are: 
 
•  the single borrower limit; anyone borrower's credit facilities should not 
exceed a certain percentage of the bank's capital, e.g. 10 percent. 
•  the capital adequacy ratio; a bank's risks assets (including but not limited 
to loans / credit facilities) must be supported by a certain percentage of 
core and possibly secondary / subordinated capital. In the GCC-countries, 
the capital adequacy ratio varies between 8 percent and 12 percent of risk-
weighted assets. Consequently, one unit of capital gives the average 
GCC-based bank the capacity to lend 10 units of currency. 
 
At a total capital base of $25 billion, the capacity of the larger GCC-based banks 
(those with a capital base of $500 million or more) to extend credit facilities 
appears limited. 
 
One of the most important yardsticks to judge a bank's performance is the 
return achieved on the bank's capital. Factoring in the risk weighting of the 
assets, banks measure their return on risk-adjusted capital. An expansion of 
activities beyond the home market should, in view of its inherent risks and 
greater volatility, produce a higher return on the capital employed than the 
return achieved in the domestic market.  
 
At present, the risk weighting of assets is based on a matrix composed of 
the borrower's home country, the type of credit facility, the maturity and the 
classification as a sovereign, bank or corporate/individual. Depending on the 
combination of these four factors, the risk weighting ranges between zero and 
100 percent. When looking at cross border business conducted by GCC-based 
banks with Arab Mediterranean countries, the risk weighting for any type of 
loan with a maturity of more than one year is 100 percent. 
 
Beyond the regulatory, "legal" capital required for risk business, most 
banks employ internal models to assess credit and operational risk across their 
entire portfolio, and measure the return derived from credit business against 
capital cost, transactional cost, and statistical probability of a certain category of 
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borrower to default, i.e. not repay the loan or perform their obligations. The 
correlation of the performance of risks within the portfolio is measured, and a 
GCC based bank employing such a portfolio model for credit risk would seek 
risks with a negative correlation to the performance of the existing portfolio 
when expanding its asset base. 
 
The introduction of a globally acceptable risk weighting and capital 
requirement model based on credit ratings by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the global banking supervisory body, has recently been delayed 
until 2005. However, banks and regulators are in agreement that rather than 
deriving the risk weighting from the before described static matrix, the capital to 
be provided for financial and operational risks should be based on the dynamic 
quality of the underlying risk. When the new rules are implemented from 2005, 
they will require substantially less capital for high quality borrowers, but higher 
amounts of capital for more risky business.  
 
Whilst most of the GCC-based banks enjoy the so called "investment 
grade rating", the present credit rating of Arab Mediterranean countries is 
substantially below investment grade. At this level, banks may be forced to 
provide as much as twice the capital required under existing rules. To still make 
the lending business profitable, the credit margins would have to be doubled, 
and at the same time the capacity of the GCC-based banks to lend to Arab 
Mediterranean countries would be halved. Also, an increase of loans to below 
investment grade - borrowers will have a negative impact on the banks' own 
ratings. 
 
The future focus of activity for GCC banks 
 
Another limiting factor may be the banks' focus on traditional banking products: 
the availability of substantial amounts of government business spoiled banks in 
the GCC region. In their home markets, they will be expected to play an 
enhanced role for the private sector, necessitating the build up of experience in 
evaluating credit applications and managing credit risk. It is at least questionable 
whether the banks, based on their limited experience in their domestic markets, 
have the know-how available to analyse and manage credit risks beyond their 
own legislation.  
 
Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) will present opportunities 
for the GCC-based banks in their regional markets: even for banks from 
neighbouring countries, the GCC's central banks have been reluctant to issue 
banking licenses over the last two decades. WTO should bring about cross-
border banking mergers or alliances in the GCC-market leading to larger, more 
efficient and higher capitalized financial institutions. However, the opening of 
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the domestic markets to foreign banks will also present significant challenges to 
the GCC-banks. In most markets, they will for the first time be exposed to 
competition, in particular in the retail- and private banking market, and foreign 
banks will target the better-rated, larger corporations with international 
operations. The profitability of the banks' clients will be affected, as some of the 
monopolistic structures in the region, e.g. exclusive agency agreements with 
suppliers from abroad, will have to relaxed. In such a scenario, the banks would 
seem well advised to focus on defending their home turf, rather then 
diversifying their business by competing in foreign markets. 
 
The GCC-based banking system appears to have limited capacity to 
contribute to the development to the Arab Mediterranean countries. Rather, the 
banks face numerous challenges in their home countries, suggesting that they 
will focus on developing, defending and expanding their franchises in the GCC 
market in the years to come.  
 
Bahrain’s role as an offshore financial centre 
 
The restrictions on foreign banks operations in the Gulf presented an 
opportunity for any country in the region seeking to purse a more liberal policy, 
as during the oil boom years of the 1970s many international banks were 
seeking to attract business from the area. Bahrain took this opportunity by 
passing Offshore Banking Regulations in 1975 that permitted foreign banks to 
register for business for a modest fee, without being liable to monetary controls 
or other regulations, provided their dealings were with non-residents.
8 Although 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had reservations about this initiative, Bahrain was 
allowed to proceed, as its neighbours recognised the need that the island had to 
diversify into services given its limited oil resources. Bahrain had a relatively 
well-educated population orientated towards service activity, partly because of 
its historical trading role, but because of the extensive British military presence 
prior to independence, which created employment for local residents in an 
English-speaking environment. 
 
The Lebanese civil war meant that Beirut banks could no longer serve the 
Gulf.
9 As a consequence there was little regional competition for Bahrain, which 
was in any case better located geographically to serve the Gulf, and enjoyed a 
common time zone with Saudi Arabia. Offshore banking quickly took off with 
$2.5 billion deposited in 1976 from neighbouring Gulf countries, and over $16 
                                            
8 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 110-
119. 
9 Jean-Francois Seznec, The Financial Markets of the Arabian Gulf, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 
12. 
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billion by 1979.
10 The number of offshore banks on the island peaked at 74 in 
1984, although subsequently the number was to fall to 46 by 1997.
11 Several 
factors brought about this decline, the most notable being the oil price declines 
of the mid to late 1980s and the Iraq-Iran and Gulf Wars. Domestic tensions in 
Bahrain between the Sunni Muslim rulers and the Shia Muslim majority 
contributed to the uncertainty, although this tension has now eased with the 
referendum on turning the island into a constitutional monarchy and the release 
of political prisoners. 
 
Those banks that have maintained their operations on the island through 
the difficulties of the late 1980s and 1990s have emerged as strong regional 
players, and the market has grown to a record size. The value of assets and 
liabilities in the offshore banks was almost $92 billion by the final quarter of 
2000,
12 and it seems probable that the market will be worth over $100 million by 
2002. Over one third of deposits come from the GCC, mainly from other banks, 
and around 30 percent of lending is to GCC institutions. However over 30 
percent of deposits come from Europe, which accounts for a similar proportion 
of lending. 
 
These transactions are largely denominated in dollars, which accounts for 
around three quarters of the total, but Euro denominated loans were worth $7.2 
billion by the end of 2000, and Euro denominated deposits worth $6.8 billion. 
These Euro denominated assets and liabilities are only to a limited extent a 
substitute for those denominated in Euro zone currencies. The decline in assets 
held in Deutsche marks over the January 1999 to December 2000 period from 
$2.9 billion to $1.1 billion only accounted for a small proportion of the rise in 
Euro denominated assets. Had the Euro been stronger against the dollar over this 
period, there seems little doubt that more offshore banks would have adopted it 
for a larger proportion of their asset holdings. The Euro has nevertheless 
emerged as the third most important vehicle currency for Bahrain’s offshore 
banks after the dollar and GCC currencies, mainly the Saudi Arabian riyal.
13 
 
Over half of offshore deposits and borrowings are between banks in 
Bahrain and their head offices or affiliates elsewhere. Around one quarter of 
deposits come from other banks, with a similar proportion from major regional 
                                            
10 Rodney Wilson, “The evolution of the Saudi banking system and its relationship with 
Bahrain”, in Tim Niblock, (ed.), State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, Croom Helm, 
1982, p. 296. 
11 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Middle East, Financial Times Publications, 
1998, p. 109. 
12 Bahrain Monetary Agency, Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, Volume 26, Number 4, 
December 2000, p. 21. 
13 Ibid., p. 22. 
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and multinational companies. Lending to these companies is less significant and 
holdings of securities on behalf of these companies account for a slightly higher 
proportion of assets. Much of the offshore activity therefore simply involves 
inter-bank transactions, usually of a short-term nature. The market is 
nevertheless an important source of liquidity for the banking system in the Gulf, 
and its future in this respect seems assured. 
 
Bahrain has also become the major centre for jointly owned regional 
banks, the most notable of which are the Arab Banking Corporation and the Gulf 
International Bank. The latter was founded in 1975 and former in 1980, but 
ABC has become the larger institution with assets worth almost $25 billion 
compared to $15 billion for GIB.
14 In 2000 GIB acquired the London based 
Saudi International Bank. This will raise the value of its assets closer to those of 
ABC. GIB is 72.5 percent owned by the Gulf Investment Corporation, which is 
in turn owned equally by the governments of all six GCC states. The remainder 
of the capital is owned by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, (22.5 percent), 
and JP Morgan, (5.3 percent).
15 ABC is owned principally by the Kuwait 
Investment Authority, (26.93 percent), the Central Bank of Libya, (26.79 
percent), and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, (25 percent).
16 GIB’s core 
activity is commercial banking, but with the takeover of Saudi International 
Bank it is better placed to provide corporate finance and portfolio management 
and advisory services. ABC provides corporate banking, treasury services, 




The most rapidly expanding segment of the banking market in the Gulf is for 
Islamic financial services. Worldwide Islamic finance has become a $140 billion 
industry, and funds deposited and invested in accordance with the shariah 
Islamic law are increasing by 15 percent per year. A significant proportion of 
these funds are deposited with Islamic financial institutions such as Al Rajhi of 
Saudi Arabia or the Kuwait Finance House on a mudarabah profit sharing basis 
that avoids the use of interest.
17 
 
Islamic banking is, at least in the context of commercial banking 
activities, not different in any way from traditional banking. The notion held in 
some quarters that non-interest based banking is benevolent or at least cheaper is 
proven wrong by the largest Islamic financial institutions in the region: Al Rajhi 
Banking and Investment Corporation and the Kuwait Finance House have for 
                                            
14 Arab Banker, Volume 14, No. 2, Autumn 2000, p. 84. 
15 www.gibonline.com/information.htm 
16 www.arabbanking.com/history.html 
17 Rodney Wilson, Islamic Finance, Financial Times Publications, 1998, p. 29. 
  13 
many years been the most profitable institutions in their respective domestic 
markets. Also, most banking supervisory authorities subject Islamic financial 
institutions to the same regulations in respect of capital, risk weighting of assets, 
or loan-deposit-ratios as "traditional" banks (even Kuwait Finance House, which 
is outside the Kuwaiti banking system, is subjected to the rules imposed on the 
Kuwaiti banks). 
 
There are fifteen Islamic financial institutions in Bahrain, which has depth 
and breadth in this field of finance that rival centres cannot match. The pool of 
expertise and diversity of activity means that the island has established a lead on 
what is a very steep learning curve. While Islamic financial institutions 
elsewhere in the Gulf are mainly retail deposit takers, those in Bahrain are 
involved in investment banking, corporate finance and project appraisal. Their 
market is the entire Arabian Peninsula and South Asia, and there are strong links 




Saudi Arabia was reluctant to licence specifically designated Islamic 
financial institutions in the 1970s and early 1980s, as all banks operating in the 
kingdom were supposed to function within the Shariah Islamic law, even though 
most failed to offer the standard Islamic deposit or funding facilities.
19 In 
contrast Bahrain welcomed designated Islamic financial institutions, especially 
those funded from Saudi Arabia. Hence the Faisal Islamic Banking group, which 
was instigated by Prince Mohammad bin Faisal of Saudi Arabia, established its 
major centre for operations on the island, as did the Albaraka group, founded by 
Sheikh Kamal Salam of Jeddah. 
 
Today these are the largest Islamic financial institutions in Bahrain. 
Albaraka has merged its segmented Islamic banking activities into a single 
operation based in Bahrain which will have a paid up capital of $550 million, 
resulting in it becoming the largest Islamic bank world wide in terms of 
capitalisation. Smaller but rapidly growing Islamic financial intermediaries 
include the First Islamic Investment Bank and the Islamic Investment Company 
of the Gulf, that are both based in Bahrain, each with a paid up capital of over 
$100 million. 
 
Recent re-organisations in Bahrain’s Islamic banking sector should 
facilitate Islamic financial activity. The merger of the Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Bahrain with the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf and the subsequent 
                                            
18 Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance “The present state of Islamic banking in the Gulf 
and its future prospects”, New Horizon, London, Number 104, November 2000, p. 3. 
19 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, 
p. 208. 
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creation of the Shamil Bank created a much larger institution with assets of 
almost $3 billion. Nabil Nasser of the former Faisal Bank was the initial 
President and Chief Executive, but this proved only a stop gap appointment, as 
on December 1
st Dr Said Al-Martin took over, having been headhunted from 




There is also regional and foreign Islamic bank involvement in Bahrain. 
The International Investor of Kuwait, which specialises in Islamic investment 
banking and private fund placements, is also seeking a share quotation on the 
Bahrain market, reinforcing the island’s position as the major centre for Islamic 
finance. Many major international banks now offer Islamic financial services, 
including Citi Bank that established a subsidiary in Bahrain in 1996, Citi Islamic 
Investment Bank. Its managing director since 1999 has been Saad Zaman, who 
was previously based in Dubai. The Arab Banking Corporation also has an 
Islamic banking unit in Bahrain. Further evidence of the significance of Bahrain 
for Islamic finance comes from the Dutch Bank ABN-Amro. It has built up a 
Global Islamic Services operation in Bahrain to undertake project financing. 
Hitherto the bank has offered Islamic liquidity management, trade finance and 
some structured asset finance, but it sees scope to offer a wider range of services 
from Bahrain. 
 
Islamic financial institutions have different types of assets and liabilities 
to conventional banks, and therefore they have to be reported upon in a different 
way. Bahrain is the headquarters of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic financial institutions, which has drawn up the standards with which 
most Islamic financial institutions have agreed to conform. The treatment of 
credits granted for trade financing is different with Islamic financial institutions 
for example, as the bank temporarily owns the goods being financed, which 
raises the issue under murabahah trade finance of whether the goods should be 
valued at the price at which they were purchased by the bank or at the higher 
mark-up priced charged by the bank for the resale to its clients. Clearly 
consistent treatment is needed if meaningful comparisons are to be made using 
the financial accounts of different Islamic financial institutions. 
 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency has acquired more experience of 
regulating Islamic financial institutions than any other central bank in the Gulf 
because of the number and diversity of Islamic financial institutions on the 
island. To date there have been no Islamic bank failures in Bahrain, and no 
scandals similar to that which affected the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1998. This 
                                            
20 Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance “Bahrain studies issuing Islamic bonds, T-bills”, 
New Horizon, London, Number 103, October 2000, p. 16. 
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bodes well for the future of Islamic banking on the island, as it brings customer 
confidence in the integrity of the institutions, and creates a stable environment 
for inter-bank dealings. The “High Council for Islamic Banking” that is being 
established to coordinate strategic developments will further reinforce the 
position of the island.
21 
 
Bahrain has also become the major centre in the Gulf for Islamic banking 
and finance conferences, which generates business for the island’s hotels. The 
International Islamic Banking Forum held annually in Bahrain attracts over 500 
bankers, and represents the largest gathering of its type with both Islamic and 
conventional bankers attending. Islamic Finance Consultants, the first specialist 
firm of its type, is also based in Bahrain. There is sufficient critical mass in 
Islamic banking to make such consulting services viable. 
 
Although Islamic project finance is still in its infancy the banks in 
Bahrain are well positioned to provide such services. There is an increasing 
demand for private financing for infrastructure work and the expansion of 
utilities such as water and electricity. In 1999 ABC Islamic Bank in Bahrain 
signed a $56 million leasing deal with the Sharjah Electricity and Water 
Authority for the purchase of two gas turbines. These turbines were needed for 
the second phase of the Wasit power station in Sharjah. The lease for the 
turbines will run for five years, with the possibility of an extension for a further 
two years. ABC Islamic Bank was able to attract 13 institutions, mostly based in 
Bahrain, to participate in the financing. 
 
An Islamic bond market 
 
The latest initiative in Bahrain involves the creation of a market in Islamic 
bonds.
22 The Bahrain Monetary Agency plans to launch secondary instruments 
that will be backed by assets such as schools and hospitals that are regarded as 
socially desirable investments by Islamic jurists. Instead of new schools and 
hospitals being funded through government borrowing, Islamic bonds will be 
issued, the returns on which will be paid out of profits generated by the schools 
or hospitals. These institutions do not necessarily have to be private, as the 
government can pay the fees on behalf of the schoolchildren, or the patients if 
they are covered by the social security system. Profits therefore depend on the 
numbers attracted, and the difference between the cost of providing the service 
and the payments received. 
 
                                            
21 Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance “Bahrain plans High Council for Islamic 
banking”, New Horizon, London, Number 107, March 2001, p. 17. 
22 Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance “Bahrain studies issuing Islamic bonds, T-bills”, 
New Horizon, London, Number 108, April 2001, p. 16. 
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A working group has been established for the International Islamic 
Financial Market (IIFM) project comprising representatives from Bahrain, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Sudan, Brunei, Iran and the Islamic 
Development Bank. The aim is to establish a global Islamic financial market as 
an alternative to conventional markets. In practice the market will have two 
bases for trading, one in Bahrain and the other on Malaysia’s offshore financial 
centre, the island of Labuan. As these are in different time zones in West and 
South East Asia, and at opposite ends of the Indian Ocean, each will have a 
hinterland that should ensure critical mass. Bahrain has already long been 
established as the major financial centre for the Gulf, and Labuan has served as 
an offshore centre for the last decade for Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. At the 
retail level transactions in Islamic bonds will be Internet based, at least in part. 
The Bahrain based Gulf Finance House, a new Islamic bank established in 
October 1999, is launching an Islamic e-bank aimed at the retail market. The 
Riyadh based backers have subscribed $32.5 million in paid-up capital, with 
Injazat Technology of Jeddah one of the shareholders. 
 
There is also to be a division of responsibilities between Bahrain and 
Labuan with respect to Islamic financial management. Bahrain is to be the 
headquarters for a liquidity management centre whose remit is to ensure markets 
in Islamic securities always have sufficient buyers and sellers to permit trading. 
In practice the major Islamic financial institutions will be expected to be market 
makers in securities issues in their name on behalf of their major clients. Labuan 
is to have a Market Management Centre that will research into the most 
appropriate methods of regulating Islamic financial markets to ensure all 
participants are able, as far as possible, to meet their purchasing and selling 
commitments. 
 
Stock market development 
 
Gulf stock markets are more developed than those in the Mediterranean Arab 
countries, as Saudi Arabia has the largest market by capitalisation in the Middle 
East or Arab World, and is second in the Muslim World after Malaysia. Its 
capitalisation of $70 billion, more than twice that of the Kuwait stock market, 
largely reflects the size of the kingdom’s economy.
23 Share price trends in Saudi 
Arabia depend on oil price developments and expectations regarding oil prices 
as might be expected.
24 International stock market developments affect market 
prices as much as government domestic policies largely because Saudi Arabian 
                                            
23 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Middle East, op. cit.,  Financial Times 
Publications, 1998, p. 235. 
24 Saudi British Bank, “The Saudi share market”, Saudi Economic Bulletin, Volume 5, 
Number 19, 2000, pp. 8-9. 
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investors in the market typically also have substantial sums invested in leading 
western markets, especially on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDEQ. 
 
Most investors are individuals of high new worth who switch funds 
between the kingdom and Western markets, as well as into cash if market 
expectations are poor. International interest rate developments tend to affect the 
market, and SIBOR, the Saudi Inter-Bank Offer Rate moves in line with 
LIBOR, the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, usually at a premium of 0.4 to 0.8 
percent reflecting the higher perceived risks on Saudi riyal deposits despite its 
fixed parity with the dollar.
25 
 
Foreign investors are not permitted to invest directly in the Saudi Arabian 
stock market, but may invest indirectly through mutual funds offered by the 
local banks. This provision is to ensure that foreign portfolio investment is not a 
back door route to the control of Saudi Arabian companies. The new foreign 
investment laws allow direct investment in many areas of the Saudi Arabian 
economy, but this is monitored and controlled through the General Investment 
Authority whose remit cannot easily be extended to portfolio investment. The 
Saudi American Bank has marketed a fund based in Saudi shares to foreign 
managers of emerging market funds with limited success. The other banks sell 
mutual fund products to non-citizens living in the kingdom, but they account for 
less than 20 percent of shareholdings in the local market. 
 
Despite its size, the Saudi Arabian stock market is much smaller than 
might be expected. Malaysia has a similar population size to Saudi Arabia, and a 
GNP only 60 percent as large,
26 yet its stock market is almost two and a half 
times the size of that of the kingdom.
27 As the major source of project finance in 
the 1970s and early 1980s was the government itself, largely through the Public 
Investment Fund, the role for private equity financing was limited.
28 By the late 
1980s more emphasis was being placed on the role of the private sector in 
development with falling oil prices, but these trends and the Gulf War did not 




                                            
25 Riyad Bank, “The Saudi money market has experienced noticeable stability since 1999”, 
Saudi Economic Review, Riyadh, Third Quarter 2000, p. 9. 
26 World Bank Atlas, 2000, pp. 42-43. 
27 Ibid, pp. 50-51 
28 Jean-Francois Seznec, The Financial Markets of the Arabian Gulf, op. cit., Croom Helm, 
1987, pp. 51-52. See also Ayman Shafiq Fayyad Abdul-Hadi, Stock Markets of the Arab 
World: Trends and Prospects for Integration, Routledge, 1988, pp. 49-51. 
29 Rodney Wilson, “Economic prospects for Iraq and its neighbours in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War”, in Haifaa A. Jawad, (ed.) The Middle East in the New World Order, Macmillan, 
London, Second edition, 1997, p. 182. 
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Despite these uncertainties by the mid 1990s the Saudi Arabian stock 
market had expanded considerably, and although the oil price falls in 1998 also 
brought stock price falls, in 1999 the all market index rose by an impressive 44 
percent.
30 The following year prices were more stagnant, but 2001 looks 
reasonably encouraging to date. The market lacks breadth however, as bank 
shares account for almost half of market capitalisation, industry one third, 
utilities 15 percent, services only 4 percent and agriculture less than one percent. 
SABIC, (Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation), is the largest quoted 
company, followed by the Saudi American Bank. 
 
As elsewhere stock markets in the Gulf are nationally rather than 
regionally based, with most investors either only investing in their own domestic 
market and in one or more major western markets, but not usually in other 
markets in the Gulf which are perceived as having similar risk characteristics. 
Any attempt to create a regional market would be resisted by those Gulf 
countries with smaller markets, notably Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the 
UAE, as the market would have to be located in Saudi Arabia, the dominant 
centre of activity. Institutions such as stock markets are a source of national 
pride, even when their actual performance is very variable. 
 
The only real attempt at a regional stock exchange was the ill-fated Souk 
al Manakh, the unofficial stock market in Kuwait, where the shares of local 
companies that could not meet the regulatory requirements of the official 
market, and those of companies registered elsewhere in the Gulf, were traded. 
This expanded rapidly after the 1979-81 oil boom, but in 1982 the bubble burst, 
and the market was closed, leaving a huge amount of bad debt that it took over a 
decade to clear up.
31 Many of the shares were purchased with borrowed money, 
and the loans could not be repaid once the share prices collapsed. The very 
limited financial information provided by the companies quoted was, however, 
the fundamental cause of the market collapse, as by 1982 stock valuation were 
excessive in relation to the underlying income and asset values of the 
companies. 
 
Unlike most developing countries Saudi Arabia has a significant mutual 
fund industry with around $7 billion invested in funds based and marketed 
within the kingdom. The banks cross sell mutual funds as investment products to 
their current and savings account holders, the National Commercial Bank being 
the most active promoter of these funds, accounting for over half the local 
                                            
30 Arab Banker, Volume 14, No. 2, Autumn 2000, p. 32. 
31 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 172-
176. 
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market.
32 Most of the funds offered are dollar denominated with the investments 
going into major multinational companies quoted in New York, but some of the 
funds invest in the stocks of local companies and are riyal denominated. Over 
one third of the mutual funds are described as Islamic, as investments are in 
companies that are screened for Shariah compliance, investment in those whose 
main source of income is derived from alcohol, pork products, gambling, 
pornography or interest transactions being prohibited. There are many parallels 




The recycling of private sector wealth  
 
The privately held wealth of the GCC is subject to many fabled myths. Numbers 
quoted for financial assets held by GCC individuals and corporations outside the 
region range between $500 billion and $1,000 billion. Given the top-heavy 
wealth distribution in the GCC-countries, with the principle source of income - 
the exploitation of the country's oil resources - still considered the property of 
the ruling families, which they then share with their subjects, the wealth will 
most probably lie in relatively few hands. The latest FORBES billionaire’s list, 
with 583 billionaires globally, shows seven billionaires with total financial 
assets of some $35 billion for Saudi Arabia alone. 
 
The perception of many bankers working in the GCC countries is that the 
privately held wealth taken abroad is viewed as financial reserve for "rainy 
days". Entrepreneurial investments abroad (i.e. foreign direct investment) are the 
exception; mostly, the money is entrusted to Swiss, American and to a very 
much lesser extent other European banks for investments in their financial 
markets. In addition to equities and bonds, GCC based investors have - perhaps 
based on the experience in their domestic markets - an inclination to invest in 
commercial real estate. 
 
Over the last five years or so, the region has been rife of talk of money 
being repatriated for investment and private sector activities in the GCC, but 
available statistics still show substantial capital out-flows from the region.  
 
                                            
32 Said Al-Shaikh, “The mutual funds market in Saudi Arabia”, NCB Economist, Volume 10, 
Number 2, March/April 2000, pp. 5-12. 
33 Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance “Monitoring the performance of Islamic equity 
funds”, New Horizon, London, Number 103, October 2000, p. 6. 
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The European Union’s Actual and Potential Role in Gulf Finance 
 
European banks have been involved in the Gulf since the early twentieth 
century, notably the British owned Eastern Bank, which operated from Iraq, but 
has a branch in Bahrain from 1917, and the Imperial Bank of Persia, later 
renamed the British Bank of the Middle East, which had a branch in Kuwait 
from 1942.
34 The Netherlands Trading Society, later the Al-Bank Al-Saudi Al-
Hollandi, established a banking operation in Jeddah in 1927,
35 thirty years 
before the arrival of Citibank in the Kingdom, although admittedly the 
Americans played a key role in the founding of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency in the 1950s which was to serve as the kingdom’s central bank.
36 
 
The scope for European bank involvement in retail services in the Gulf is 
limited however, as the countries are reluctant, as already indicated, to open up 
their domestic markets to international competition. There is more potential for 
co-operation with existing local banks, through the provision of specialist 
services, although even in this respect institutions such as the Arab Banking 
Corporation and the Gulf International Bank play a major role, reducing the 
need for reliance on wholly European owned banks. There is a continuing 
demand from the Gulf for private banking services from clients of high net 
worth, the main competition for European Union banks coming from the Swiss. 
There is potential for European Union based banks to develop Islamic financial 
products for the Gulf market. Some, notably London based HSBC,
37 and the 
Dutch bank ABN-Amro, are active in this market with specialist Islamic 
banking units, but other leading European banks tend to provide such services 
on a one-off rather than on a regular basis. 
 
Capital market integration between Gulf and European markets is more 
problematic when neither region has an integrated market.
38 There is scope for 
cross listing by major Gulf companies such as SABIC or Etisalat, the UAE 
mobile telephone company, the largest quoted company in the region in terms of 
market capitalisation.
39 Another possibility would be for major European stock 
markets to provide technical assistance to markets in the Gulf. NASDEQ may 
                                            
34 Rodney Wilson, “Financial development of the Arab Gulf: the Eastern Bank experience, 
1917-1950, Business History, Volume 29, Number 2, April 1987, pp. 178-198. 
35 Adnan M. Abdeen and Dale N. Shook, The Saudi Financial System, Wiley, 1984, p. 60. 
36 Arthur N. Young, Saudi Arabia: the Making of a Financial Giant, New York University 
Press, 1983, pp. 55-74. 
37 Rodney Wilson, “Islamic investment products in the UK”, Institute of Islamic Banking and 
Insurance, New Horizon, London, Number 107, March 2001, pp. 3-4. 
38 Henry Azzam, “Gulf capital markets: development prospects and constraints”, in Heba 
Handoussa, (ed.), Development of Financial Markets in the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, 
Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, 1995, pp. 181-198. 
39 www.meed.co.uk/top500.asp?Target=top 
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look to expand its influence by building such alliances with other exchanges 
through joint ventures and European markets may wish to participate in or 
compete to establish similar ventures in the Gulf. 
 
Regulatory issues differ in the GCC to those in the European Union, but 
there is scope for co-operation with agencies in Europe such as the Financial 
Services Authority in the United Kingdom, that liases with Gulf central banks in 
any case regarding banks from the region with a presence in London. There is 
also scope for co-operation with the European Central Bank given its experience 
in managing the single currency, as the GCC states are seeking to maintain fixed 
parities between their currencies as a move towards a regional currency union. 
 
The GCC states are interested in using the Euro as an alternative to the 
dollar in the interests of diversification. The adoption of the Euro in the GCC 
will be determined by its international acceptance as a vehicle currency and 
asset holding currency by third parties. This will in turn depend on how the Euro 
performs on currency exchanges against the dollar. Some move away from 
Eurodollar deposits into Euro was expected by Gulf commercial banks after the 
advent of the new currency in January 1999,
40 but so far the banks have been 
very cautious. This has also been the case with the central banks and monetary 
agencies in the Gulf, which continue to hold reserves largely in dollars. As oil 
prices are dollar denominated and as Gulf currencies are maintained at fixed 
parities to the dollar it is inevitable that the use of the Euro will remain limited, 
both for payments and for intervention purposes to support Gulf currencies. 
 
The future use of the Euro in the Gulf will ultimately depend on the extent 
of European Union trade and financial transactions with the region, as well as on 
the Euro’s perceived success in relation to the dollar. The adoption of the Euro 
will reflect, rather than drive, these economic relations. Given the strained 
political relations between the Gulf and the United States over Israel and the fact 
that the Gulf states may be excluded from the proposed American missile 
defence shield against rogue states, there may be a political desire to see a 
repositioning of Gulf economic interests. Unfortunately economic realities may 




Eberhard Brodhage & Rodney Wilson 
                                            
40 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Middle East, op. cit.,  Financial Times 
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  25Aggregate loans, assets and equity of Bahrain banks, December 2000 
 








Bahrain  Al Baraka Islamic Bank BSC  Islamic    139 193 59
Bahrain  Al-Ahli Commercial Bank B.S.C  Commercial    527 866 127
Bahrain  Alubaf Arab International Bank  Commercial    75 146 62
Bahrain  Arab Banking Corporation BSC  Offshore  BBB-  4.294 10.436 1.851
Bahrain  Arab Islamic Bank EC   Islamic    50 82 56
Bahrain  Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C.  Specialised    24 65 32
Bahrain  Bahrain International Bank E.C.   Investment  BBB   18 967 224
Bahrain  Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C.  Islamic    341 416 40
Bahrain  Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC  Commercial    266 425 83
Bahrain  Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C.  Commercial    1.345
 
2.734 277
Bahrain  BMB Investment Bank    Investment BBB- 13 656 122
Bahrain  Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C.  Commercial    194 298 31
Bahrain  Gulf International Bank BSC  Offshore  BBB+  3.023 15.120 1.206
Bahrain  Investcorp Bank EC  Investment  BBB  3.131 763
Bahrain  Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahrain)  Islamic    76 182 115
Bahrain  National Bank of Bahrain  Commercial    1.057 2.753 286
Bahrain  Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC  Commercial    110 289 128
Bahrain  TAIB Bank E.C.  Investment    34 513 121
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Commerzbank Global Financial Institutions Risk Management DepartmentAggregate loans, assets and equity of Kuwait and Oman banks, December 2000 
 








Kuwait  Alahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC)  Commercial    1.679 3.817 474
Kuwait  Bank of Kuwait & The Middle East (The)  Commercial    1.095 2.948 415
Kuwait  Burgan Bank SAK  Commercial    1.545 3.776 470
Kuwait  Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The)  Commercial  BBB+  2.377 5.055 597
Kuwait  Gulf Bank KSC (The)  Commercial  BBB+  3.067 5.412 593
Kuwait  Industrial Bank of Kuwait K.S.C.  Specialised    242 1.149 391
Kuwait  Kuwait Finance House  Islamic    3.566 5.815 606
Kuwait  Kuwait Real Estate Bank  Commercial    1.385 1.788 282
Kuwait  National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K.  Commercial  A-  4.244 12.477 1.312
Oman  Bank Dhofar Al-Omani Al-Fransi (saoc)  Commercial  BBB-  513 680 89
Oman  Bank Muscat SAOG  Commercial  BBB-  1.514 1.942 163
Oman  Bank of Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait SAOG  Commercial    345 586 63
Oman  Commercial Bank of Oman S.A.O.G.  Commercial  BBB-  1.003 1.335 189
Oman  Industrial Bank of Oman SAOG  Specialised    87 134 67
Oman  Majan International Bank SAOC  Commercial    129 180 67
Oman  National Bank of Oman (SAOG)  Commercial    1.599 2.165 286
Oman  Oman Arab Bank SAOG  Commercial    591 718 100
Oman  Oman Development Bank SAOG  Specialised    264 298 54
Oman  Oman Housing Bank (S.A.O.C.)  Specialised    435 444 141
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Commerzbank Global Financial Institutions Risk Management DepartmentAggregate loans, assets and equity of Qatar and Saudi Arabia banks, December 2000 
 








Qatar  Al Ahli Bank of Qatar (Q.S.C.)  Commercial    365 733 78 
Qatar  Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 
 
Commercial    627 1.275 139 
Qatar        Doha  Bank Commercial 747 1.391 123
Qatar  Qatar Industrial Development Bank  Specialised    4 68 45 
Qatar  Qatar International Islamic Bank  Islamic    439 505 83 
Qatar  Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ  Islamic    861 1.094 83 
Qatar  Qatar National Bank  Commercial  BBB  3.745 6.764 1.191 
Saudi Arabia  Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi  Commercial    3.848 8.657 881 
Saudi Arabia  Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation  Islamic  BBB+  5.556 11.434 1.517 
Saudi Arabia  Arab National Bank  Commercial  A-  3.441 9.454 817 
Saudi Arabia  Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation - APICORP  Specialised    854 1.640 626 
Saudi Arabia  Bank Al-Jazira  Commercial    460 1.321 161 
Saudi Arabia  National Commercial Bank (The)  Commercial    15.064 24.519 2.144 
Saudi Arabia  Riyad Bank  Commercial    5.466 17.471 2.136 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi American Bank  Commercial  BBB+  8.406 21.514 2.294 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi British Bank (The)  Commercial  BBB+  4.614 11.505 944 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Hollandi Bank  Commercial    2.451 5.048 436 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Investment Bank (The)  Commercial  A-  1.883 3.521 453 




Bankscope Database V 16.00 (distributed by Bureau van Dijk). 
Commerzbank Global Financial Institutions Risk Management DepartmentAggregate loans, assets and equity of UAE banks, December 2000 
 








UAE  Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank  Commercial    4.086 6.277 861
UAE  Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank  Islamic    577 730 305
UAE  Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade -  Commercial    337 1.434 329
UAE  Arab Emirates Investment Bank PSJC  Investment    3 58 17
UAE  Bank of Sharjah  Commercial    267 465 88
UAE  Commercial Bank International PLC  Commercial    358 469 69
UAE  Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C.  Commercial  A  1.239 1.696 288
UAE  Dubai Islamic Bank plc  Islamic    2.057 2.542 286
UAE  Emirates Bank International PJSC  Commercial    4.047 5.603 884
UAE  Emirates Industrial Bank  Specialised    148 264 121
UAE  First Gulf Bank  Commercial    356 557 123
UAE       
       
Investbank  Plc Commercial 399 607 111
UAE Mashreqbank Commercial 3.038 5.440 664
UAE  Middle East Bank PJSC  Commercial    355 593 162
UAE  National Bank of Abu Dhabi  Commercial  A+  4.557 8.522 718
UAE  National Bank of Dubai Ltd. (The)  Commercial    1.902 7.664 1.118
UAE  National Bank of Fujairah  Commercial    386 667 124
UAE  National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.)  Commercial    358 492 128
UAE  National Bank of Sharjah  Commercial    332 423 120
UAE  National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain  Commercial    329 478 106
UAE  Union National Bank  Commercial  A  1.787 2.681 311




Bankscope Database V 16.00 (distributed by Bureau van Dijk). 
Commerzbank Global Financial Institutions Risk Management Department  
Aggregate loans, assets and equity of GCC banks, December 2000 
 






Total Commercial Banks (54)  104.635 217.508 25.250
Total Islamic Banks (10)  13.662 22.993 3.150
Total Investment Banks (6)  168 6.058 1.455
Total Specialised Banks (8)  2.058 4.062 1.477
Total Offshore Banks (2)  7.317 25.556 3.057
Total all banks  127.840 276.177 34.389
 
Sources: 
Bankscope Database V 16.00 (distributed by Bureau van Dijk). 
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